At night in the dark, the sea looks just like a city. That’s how many lights can be seen, says Indonesian fisherman Muhammad Rapi. Most come from foreign ships at anchor, although they sometimes also fish at night. “Then we have to pay attention, because they often sail with two ships and a dragnet in between. They can pull our boat with them in their nets.”
Rapi moves as if he is one with his bright blue-painted fishing boat. With his feet he operates the steering wheel and the clutch of the engine, while at the same time he hangs with his upper body from the window with a fishing line that disappears into the depths. He immediately feels it when the strip of fish he had put on the hook as bait has disappeared. Or, which happens less often, if he has a bite.
For the fishermen of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands, a small archipelago in the south of the South China Sea, competitors from Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan and China are “our greatest fear, our number one fear,” says Muhammad Rapi. The foreign ships often sail into their Exclusive Economic Zone, where according to international sea treaties only Indonesia has the right to fish. “They drag their nets over the bottom and take all the fish away.” The trawls destroy the coral, where the fish reproduce and get their food.
In the South China Sea, the fishermen act as pawns in a field of mounting tensions. China’s presence and assertiveness at sea has been increasing for years, to the chagrin of other countries in the region. And to their discomfort, because how do you counterbalance such a superpower?
In March, Muhammad Rapi went out to sea with some of his mates for the last long time. Usually they go for ten or twelve days, and then they sail all the way to the border of the Indonesian economic zone. This time they saw a naval ship “number 171”, they determined that it must be a Chinese ship. Rapi shows videos on his phone, there were also foreign fishing vessels. Reporting was only possible days later, because Rapi has no satellite connection on his boat.
This kind of confrontation with, probably, the Chinese navy is the exception rather than the rule. More often the Indonesians come across Vietnamese ships. Logical, says researcher Collin Koh of the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, because for years an unresolved conflict has been going on between Indonesia and Vietnam over the boundaries of their economic zones: “Both countries believe that their fishermen have the right to fish there. .” Yet China poses the greater risk, Koh says: “China has been messing with Southeast Asian countries for years at sea.”
Economical interests
China claims almost the entire South China Sea and says it has “historical rights” to about 90 percent of the waters. The nine dash line, a line of nine dashes on the map, indicates the so-called Chinese territory, which overlaps with waters belonging to the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei. An international court ruling from 2016 that that line has no legal value and that China can therefore not claim the areas, does not prevent Beijing from doing anything.
The nine lines also partly overlap with the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone near Natuna and that sometimes leads to tensions. At the end of 2019, there was a serious incident when Indonesia found a Chinese naval vessel with a group of Chinese fishing vessels in that zone. And in 2016, the Indonesian navy fired warning shots at a group of Chinese ships.
However, Indonesia does not see itself as a party to the territorial conflict. “China has never disclosed the exact coordinates of the area they claim. So, Indonesia argues, there can be no dispute either,” explains Collin Koh. This is useful geopolitically, he says, because the Indonesian government has major economic interests in a good relationship with China. The country invests billions in Indonesia every year and, conversely, China is one of the main importers of Indonesian palm oil, coal and rubber. Not to mention Chinese vaccine diplomacy – Indonesia gets the bulk of its corona vaccines from China.
The Indonesian government has sent fishermen from the island of Java to Natuna for reinforcements
Only, meanwhile, the fishermen have a problem. In the small harbor of Natuna, residents arrive on their mopeds around seven in the morning, to be able to buy fish directly from ships that have just returned from the sea. Fish that’s “only once died,” they call it, instead of the multiple deaths that a frozen fish dies before it ends up on a plate somewhere far away.
But the catch is disappointing today. After ten days at sea, skipper Wan Zakarti and his two crew members arrive. On the deck are grubby T-shirts, they smoke cigarettes until their client comes by to inspect the catch. Their big coolers aren’t nearly as full of red snappers as they’d like. The sea is empty. “We caught something like 600 kilos in ten days. Two years ago we brought in 900 or sometimes 1,000 kilos.” It is always careful for the foreign ships, says Zakarti. And although he often cannot see well under which flag they are flying, “there are more than us”.
Coastguard
Despite the major economic interests, the Indonesian government is certainly not going to let it go. In 2017, President Joko Widodo declared the Indonesian economic zone the North Natuna Sea as a diplomatic signal to China. The Philippines has already done the same with their part of the sea, the West Philippine Sea.
After the confrontation with China at the end of 2019, Jakarta took more concrete measures to boost its defence. Bakamla Coast Guard, officially not part of the fighting force, was given permission to arm its ships. The navy announced that an important command post will be moved from the capital Jakarta to Natuna. And just last week, the Ministry of Defense announced that it will invest considerably more in new equipment in the coming years, among other things to be able to do more checks in the South China Sea.
The Bakamla Coast Guard lookout on Natuna is located on a hill surrounded by palm trees. Their team here is modest: with a club of six, they keep watch. At sea, their patrol ships confiscate dozens of fishing boats every year, says officer Rachma. The ships and their crews are handing them over to the Ministry of Fisheries for further investigation. Often the captain is sentenced and the crew is deported to the country of origin. “The cooperation with the fishermen is very important to us,” says Rachma, “if they see suspicious ships, they can report them to us and we will investigate”.
Some other elements of the strategy to defend Indonesia’s waters more vigorously are docked on the other side of the island. Rough men with bare torsos hammer noisily on an engine part. They rest for a week ashore before sailing for another three weeks. Last year, the government sent dozens of fishing vessels here from Java to increase Indonesia’s presence in Natuna waters. They tell the same story as the local fishermen: the foreign ships get in the way and disrupt their catch.
Local fishermen such as Muhammad Rapi, in turn, are not so happy with this reinforcement from their own country. For them, this only means additional competition at sea. The Javanese fishermen also use larger equipment. “We only fish with lines. We suddenly found ourselves in a bind between fishermen from home and abroad.” The program was short-lived – most Javanese fishermen have already left because their catches were disappointing.
Fortunately, relations between the local fishermen and coastguard Bakamla and the navy are good, Rapi says, and they are aware of their problems. When they return home, the fishermen can fill out an online form if they have seen suspicious activities at sea. Only then, of course, it is often too late. “If you want to make fishermen a serious part of the defense strategy, then we need to get resources for telecommunications. Give us satellite phones so the Navy can come right away if we make a report.”
Corruption Problems
It is true, says analyst Collin Koh, that fishermen from Vietnam and China are often better equipped than the Indonesians. Their ships are larger and they receive subsidies for, for example, fuel or their engines. This creates an unfair battle: “It is also a matter of priorities and budget. The Indonesian Ministry of Fisheries is not functioning very well. It suffers from corruption problems.” Last November, the minister and a group of senior officials were arrested on suspicion of fraud involving export licenses for baby lobsters.
Indonesia is very aware of its geographically crucial position in the region and therefore wants to “maintain as much strategic autonomy as possible,” says Koh. That means: avoiding quarrels with superpowers, but certainly not making too close connections. That’s why President Joko Widodo will probably never join The Quad, the new alliance of the United States, India, Australia and Japan. Koh: „That initiative will be so clearly set up as a front against China – Indonesia will not want to get burned.”
International Sea Rules
International sea rules are laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Both China and the other countries around the South China Sea have signed this treaty.
The treaty was created to end international conflicts over fishing rights and oil extraction and stipulates that the boundary for territorial waters is 12 nautical miles (about 22.2 kilometers) offshore. Until then, the laws of the country in question apply.
This is followed by a Connecting Zone and the Exclusive Economic Zone. The latter zone applies up to 200 nautical miles from the coast, in which countries have the right to exploit all natural resources, such as oil, gas and fish. Ships from other countries only have the right of passage in that zone. After the 200 miles, the international waters begin, waters that are freely accessible to all states, but do not belong to any state.