A report published recently by the London-based research centre Overseas Development Institute (ODI), highlights the scale and governance issues of China’s Distant Water Fishing (DWF) fleet. To do so, the authors analysed data for 2017 and 2018 using big data analytic techniques, ensemble algorithms and geographic information systems (GIS). Some of their key findings are that China’s DWF fleet might be much larger than the 3,000 estimated vessels, with a significant percentage flagged to other countries, mostly to African nations. The report also explains that the ownership of China DWF fleet is very complex and opaque, with a majority of the vessels owned by small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which complicate China’s capacity to monitor and control their operations.
n the conclusions, the authors propose some recommendations to improve the management of the China’s DWF fleet and underscore the need for more effective regional and global action, especially in monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) and through measures to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Whereas the report attempts to demonstrate that the Chinese DWF fleet is much larger than estimated and explores its potential impact on resources in addition to other fleets also fishing in distant waters, there remains some questions with regards to the methodology, and the figures need to be taken with caution.
The authors used data from 2017 and 2018 from the Krakken database (FishSpektrum) to create their own database of all possible DWF vessels with a conceivable connection to China. To observe the behaviour of the vessels, they used GIS software to visualize automatic identification system (AIS) data and identify fishing manoeuvres according to the movement patterns (for more detailed information, see Annex 1 and 2 of the report).
The authors accurately argument that the majority of social, environmental and economic costs have been borne by developing coastal States, and, we would add, especially by the coastal fishing communities, such as those of the West Africa region. In contrast with the EU’s increasing attention to transparency, the opacity of Chinese DWF and lack of access to reliable data shields it from public accountability. In addition, the lack of political will and capacity of the African coastal states to sustainably manage the exploitation of their marine resources and the inability of the international community to find consensus on several matters related to IUU and DWF further hamper a global sustainable management of fisheries.
In their conclusion, the authors propose some recommendations to the Chinese government, to coastal developing States and to international bodies and agencies. Among the key recommendations to China are the targeting of MCS efforts on the state-owned or state-linked companies, the strengthening of capacity-building for MCS in developing States where Chinese DWF fleet is active and introducing disincentives for bottom-trawling on all Chinese-flagged vessels. The main recommendation to coastal States is to publish all international fisheries arrangements, a clause that is actually increasingly being added to EU-third countries Sustainable Fishing Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) and which is a main requirement for the countries that are signatories of the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI). For international bodies and agencies, there is a strong emphasis on improving MCS and prosecution to companies suspected of IUU activities.