New Zealand is not the only country to utilise an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system for fisheries management, but has a more comprehensive programme than other nations and is therefore regarded by commentators as the leading exponent.
As other countries consider privatising
their fisheries, the New Zealand experience provides a salutory example for assessing the effectiveness of ITQs for fisheries management.
This paper provides an appraisal of the workings of the New Zealand ITQ system in theory and in practice. First it outlines the history of, and current situation of the system implemented in New Zealand. Then against this backdrop, it summarises the theoretical pros and cons of ITQ systems and considers these against the Greenpeace criteria for fisheries management. The actual outcomes of implementation of the ITQ system, in New Zealand are then discussed.
It is concluded that, assessed with reference to Greenpeace criteria of ecosystem viability,species conservation and social justice, the ITQ system is flawed both in theory and in practice.
Fisheries management deals with conservation and catch allocation. The latter in particular involves issues of social justice. Allocation from local independent fishers to large-scale and corporate enterprises has been one clear result of ITQ management systems, a process thinly disguised as
“profesionalisation”, rationalisation and economic efficiency.
The New Zealand ITQ system has been extremely successful for this purpose. Greenpeace criteria for fisheries management stress, by contrast,the primacy of conservation of the marine ecosystem with a proactive and precautionary approach.
Management should engender cooperation rather than competition among fishers and between all the interest groups and be transparent, publically accountable and contestable. New Zealand’s present ITQ system does not put conservation as the top priority. Since environmental impact assessments (EIAs) are not a prominent feature, it is not proactive nor precautionary. While, in desperation there are some signs of some cooperation amongst fishers, competition is still rife.
The management system is participatory at only one level which makes it translucent at best and therefore far from accountable. Contestability is negated by the expense of taking effective action to prevent abuses.
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